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Old Glory and Flag Protection
Legislation: Can Congress Wrap Itself in
the Flag Without Getting Burned?
That the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen
stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be thirteen stars,
white in a blue field, representing a new constellation.'
I. Introduction
In June 1777, the Continental Congress adopted the red, white,
and blue stars and stripes design as the official flag of the United
States.' That same design rises today during times of war and peace,
earning more universal honor than any other American symbol.
Since its inception, the American flag has garnered its own anthem,3
march,4 manner of deliverance, and day of recognition.6 Yet, al-
though the stars and stripes symbolize American freedom, the Gov-
ernment has had to limit freedom by enacting legislation to preserve
the flag as the national symbol.7 Congress's broad and varied powers
include the power to establish a national flag and the power to pro-
tect its integrity.8 Congress has enacted several statutes regarding
the flag.' In addition, Congress,10 and forty-eight of the fifty states11
1. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2553, 2549 (1989) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
from 8 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 464 (Ford 3d. 1907)).
Rehnquist's strong dissent is seasoned with powerful metaphors and poetic imagery, signifying
the symbolic nature of the flag.
2. 8 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 464 (Ford ed. 1907).
3. In 1931, Congress declared The Star Spangled Banner to be the national anthem. 36
U.S.C. § 170 (1931).
4. The Stars and Stripes Forever, by John Philip Sousa, was designated in 1987 as the
national march. 36 U.S.C. § 188 (1988).
5. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1988), establishes The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag and the
procedure for the flag's deliverance.
6. Flag Day is June 14. 36 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 9-12.
8. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 586 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 176 (1988) (respect for the flag); 36 U.S.C. § 174 (1988) (dis-
play of the flag).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1968) provides: "Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any
flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon
it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both." Id.
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-12 (1982); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3703
(1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-51-207 (Supp. 1989); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE. § 614 (West
1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-11-204 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-258a (1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. !1, § 1331 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 876.52 (1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 711-1107
(1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-601 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-488 (1988); WASH. REV.
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have passed laws prohibiting the desecration or burning of the
American flag.
In 1968, Congress responded to an outbreak of flag burning in
the United States and abroad by passing a statute making desecra-
tion of the American flag a criminal offense. 2 The statute granted
concurrent jurisdiction to both federal and state law enforcement
agencies.13 The United States Supreme Court never reviewed this
federal statute,"' which is aimed solely at prohibiting public physical
desecration of the flag.'"
In 1980, Teresa Kime and Donald Bonwell were convicted for
violating the former federal flag desecration statute" by publicly
burning the American flag.' 7 The United States Supreme Court de-
clined to review the decision, thus keeping forty-eight state laws and
the federal statute intact.' 8 Justice William Brennan's dissent from
the denial of certiorari expressed his opinion that the federal law
would not have survived constitutional scrutiny.' 9 The court's deci-
sion left open the question of whether flag burning is constitutionally
protected speech, and, if so, whether Congress's interest in protecting
the flag as a national symbol outweighs the first amendment right to
free speech.
Seven years after the Kime decision, the Supreme Court cast
doubt on the constitutionality of all flag desecration statutes. In
Texas v. Johnson,"0 the Court invalidated a Texas flag desecration
statute 21 by affirming a Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision
2 2
CODE § 9.86.030 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-1-8 (1989); WIs. STAT. § 946.05 (1982).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968) (amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990)). Ramsey
Clark, Attorney General under the Nixon administration, stated:
The American people are deeply devoted to their flag. It is in the hearts and
minds of our citizens, the symbol of our national ideal: "liberty and justice for
all." We are deeply hurt when our flag is dishonored for it represents not only a
noble history and the sacrifice and spirit of our fathers, but our aspirations for
our children and their fulfillment.
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2507, 2510.
13. Id. at 2508.
14. See, e.g. United States v. Kime, 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 949 (1982).
15. See S. REP. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1507, 1509 ("The bill does not prohibit speech, the communication of ideas,
or political dissent or protest.").
16. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1968) (amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990)).
17. United States v. Kime, 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Kime r').
18. Kime v. United States, 459 U.S. 949 (1982) ("Kime Ir').
19. Id. at 951 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("1 feel sure the Court
would be persuaded after full briefing and oral argument that petitioners' convictions violate
their First Amendment rights .... .
20. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
21. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
22. 706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
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that reversed the conviction of Gregory Lee Johnson.2" The Court
held that Johnson's burning of the American flag constituted expres-
sive conduct, and was, therefore, protected by the first amendment. "4
The Court's decision evoked public outrage and prompted legislative
attempts to draft the first constitutional amendment since 1971.
This Comment examines the controversy surrounding flag dese-
cration, which was inspired by the Johnson decision. The Comment
analyzes the Johnson decision and its repercussions. Next, this Com-
ment addresses the congressional responses to the Court's holding,
including the initial failure of the proposed constitutional amend-
ment. This Comment outlines the constitutional deficiencies of the
Flag Protection Act of 1989 and discusses the United States Su-
preme Court's holding in United States v. Eichman.25 Finally, this
Comment explores alternative means that Congress and the states
might employ to permissibly restrict the physical mistreatment of
the American flag. It also considers the merits of several statutory
responses to the Eichman decision.
II. Synopsis of the Conflict
A. The Backdrop: Texas v. Johnson
The 1984 Republican National Convention was held in Dallas,
Texas. Protesting the Reagan administration and certain Dallas-
based corporations, Gregory Lee Johnson immersed an American
flag in kerosene and set it ablaze.26 Johnson and his fellow protesters
watched the flag burn, chanting, "America, the red, white and blue,
we spit on you. '27 Johnson was convicted of flag desecration and re-
ceived a one-year prison sentence and a $2000 fine.28 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed Johnson's convic-
tion, 29 but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed.30 The
23. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537 (1989).
24. Id. at 2544.
25. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
26. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (1989).
27. Id.
28. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989), entitled "Desecration of a Vener-
ated Object," provides in pertinent part:
a. A person commits an offense if he knowingly desecrates:
(3) a state or national flag.
b. For purposes of this section, 'desecrate' means deface, damage or other-
wise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one
or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.
Id.
29. Texas v. Johnson, 706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
30. Texas v. Johnson, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari31 and affirmed the
reversal.82
The Court concluded that Johnson's actions constituted expres-
sive conduct protected by the first amendment"3 and that the Texas
statute suppressed free expression. 4 It was important that the Texas
flag desecration statute did not prohibit the physical mistreatment of
the flag in all circumstances, but only impairments likely to cause
serious offense to others." The Court determined that Johnson's po-
litical flag burning was protected "because of the content of the mes-
sage he conveyed," and was, therefore, subjected to the Court's
"most exacting scrutiny."" The state's asserted interests in prevent-
ing breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a national sym-
bol were insufficient to justify the governmental restrictions on free
speech.31
B. The Immediate Legislative Response-A Constitutional
Amendment
The initial response to the Johnson decision was a plea for a
constitutional amendment permitting Congress and the states to ban
the desecration of the flag.38 United States Senator Strom Thur-
mond, bolstered by the support of the three million member Ameri-
can Legion, battled in the Senate for an amendment. 9 Robert Bork,
former United States Court of Appeals judge, testified before the
United States Congress: "If Chief Justice John Marshall's 1803 de-
31. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 257 (1988).
32. Id. at 2533, 2538.
33. The court noted: "Because the prosecution of a person who had not engaged in ex-
pressive conduct would pose a different case, and because we are capable of disposing of this
case on narrower grounds, we address only Johnson's claim that § 42.09 as applied to political
expression like his violates the First Amendment." Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
34. Id. at 2540.
35. Id. at 2547.
36. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321
(1988)).
37. Id. at 2546-47.
38. The proposed constitutional amendment stated: "The Congress and the states shall
have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States." S.J. Res.
180, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The constitutional amendment was introduced by the Sen-
ate minority leader, Robert Dole (R-Kansas).
39. 135 CONG. REC. S13344 (daily ed, Oct. 13, 1989). As a member of the American
legion, Senator Thurmond promoted the constitutional amendment stating:
Many of [the American Legion members] have a depth of understanding of the
flag, which many Americans may not have . . . . [W]hen their three million
members speak, it. is important that we carefully consider what they have to say.
In this case, they have spoken in a clear voice in support of a constitutional
amendment to protect the flag.
Id.
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cision in Marbury v. Madison40 means anything, it means you may
not overturn a decision like this by statute. Only a constitutional
amendment will be effective."'
'1
Lawyers advocating for the constitutional amendment insisted
that the alternative federal statute would be a futile attempt to rem-
edy the effect of Texas v. Johnson.42 Supporters of the constitutional
amendment viewed the Johnson decision as invalidating any law, re-
gardless of its wording, if the law applied to political expression simi-
lar to that of Gregory Lee Johnson.43 Yet, by October 1989, the mo-
mentum building in support of the amendment had subsided and the
United States Senate failed to obtain the two-thirds vote necessary
for approval.44
Opponents argued that the proposed amendment marked the
first time in nearly two centuries that Congress had attempted to
alter the Bill of Rights.45 In addition, the proposed amendment
merely made explicit Congress's authority to legislate with respect to
the flag. This is a power that Congress has exercised since 1947."
Moreover, any law passed pursuant to the amendment would still
have to satisfy the first amendment.4 7 Unless Congress improperly
intended that the proposed amendment would affect the first amend-
ment or other provisions of the Bill of Rights, it would have little
effect on the Johnson decision.48 Laws passed under the amendment
40. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Marbury established the United States Supreme
Court's power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. Id.
41. Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity of the American Flag: Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1989) (hereinafter Senate Hearing] (tes-
timony of Robert H. Bork).
42. Senate Hearing, supra note 41.
43. See generally CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Vol. 47, No. 35, at 2255 (Sept. 1989).
44. U.S. CONST. art. V provides that a two-thirds majority of each chamber of Congress
is required to pass a constitutional amendment. If both chambers approve the amendment, it
must be ratified by three-fourths, or thirty-eight, of the fifty states. Id.
45. Opponents of the proposed constitutional amendment maintained that it would per-
mit Congress to abridge free speech, thus altering the Bill of Rights. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19,
1989, at A28, col. 1. Yet, proponents argued that the constitutional amendment reflected a
legitimate effort to preserve a national symbol. Senator Gramm asserted: "[l]n looking at [the
amendment's] language, how could this in any way limit the legitimate freedom of the Ameri-
can people? . . . You cannot be more straightforward, simple, and direct than that." 135
CONG. REC. S13607 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1989).
46. See, e.g., 4 U.S.C. § 1 (1947) (design of flag); 36 U.S.C. § 174 (1988) (display of
flag); 36 U.S.C. § 176 (respect for flag).
47. See generally Senate Hearings (testimony of Walter Dellinger, Professor of Law,
Duke University Law School) ("Texas v. Johnson would be decided exactly the same way
under this proposed amendment because any exercise of the power granted to Congress under
the amendment that turned on the communicative message or impact (as the Texas statute
did) would continue to be invalid under the First Amendment.") (quoting colleague William
Van Alstyne).
48. Id.
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would vary according to each state's interpretation of what consti-
tutes "the flag" or "physical desecration." A lack of uniformity and
conflicting court decisions would result.
Opponents of the amendment argued:
The Constitution of the United States is our fundamental char-
ter of government. We should not tamper with it to adjust for
what must fairly be understood as matters of only secondary im-
portance in the overall scheme of American government. We
have not in the past, and we should not in the present, submit to
the temptation to invoke the solemn processes of [a] constitu-
tional amendment to override a decision of the Supreme Court
just because it offends--or even deeply offends-a substantial
majority of our citizens. Such a practice would clutter, trivialize
and, indeed, denigrate the Constitution and the broad principles
for which it stands.4'
The constitutional amendment was buried by lawmakers who pre-
ferred to support the less controversial Flag Protection Act.50 Propo-
nents of the constitutional amendment warned that if the federal
statute failed to survive a constitutional challenge, the amendment
would resurface with even stronger support.51
C. Congress's Compromise-The Federal Statute
In an effort to stifle the support for a constitutional amendment,
Democrats introduced the "Flag Protection Act of 1989.1152 The act
amended the former federal law5" to "protect the physical integrity
of the flag."54 Proponents of the constitutional amendment argued
that the Johnson decision rendered unconstitutional all flag desecra-
tion laws, and maintained that the federal statute would not survive
constitutional scrutiny.55 Senator Robert Dole, author of the consti-
49. Id.
50. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (1982 & Supp. 1990)), became law on October 28, 1989, without the
signature of the President.
51. The United States Constitution states that two-thirds of the fifty states may call a
constitutional convention to propose an amendment. U.S. Co NsT. art. V. The amendment
would still require the ratification of three-fourths of the fifty states. The most recent constitu-
tional convention that was called by the states was the Constitutional Convention of 1789.
52. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989) (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990)), was introduced by Representative Jack Brooks, a
Democrat from Texas. See also, U.S. CONST. art. V, providing that a two-thirds majority of
each chamber must pass a constitutional amendment. The amendment also requires the ratifi-
cation of three-fourths of the fifty states. id.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1968).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a) (Supp. 1990).
55. President Bush refused to sign the bill, stating, "I'm withholding [my] signature to
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tutional amendment, voiced his doubts regarding the federal statute,
stating: "My opinion of the statute is well-known. I believe that the
statute is nothing more than legal hocus-pocus-that it is grossly
overbroad and most probably unconstitutional . . . . [I]t is a defen-
sive and weak-kneed response to a Supreme Court decision that
ninety-seven senators considered a grave mistake.""
Nevertheless, supporters of the federal statute argued that
Johnson merely applies to laws that turn on the communicative na-
ture of the defendant's conduct; a law seeking to prohibit all flag
desecration would fall outside the realm of Johnson.5 7 The Texas
statute5 8 at issue in Johnson was not aimed at protecting the physi-
cal integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but only at conduct
likely to offend others.5 ' The statutory restriction on flag burning
was content-based, and, by its very nature, reached expressive con-
duct protected by the first amendment.60
III. Flag Desecration-Sheltered by the First Amendment
A. The Communicative Nature of Flag Desecration
In United States v. O'Brien,"1 the Supreme Court held that all
conduct is not subject to the protections of the first amendment
merely because the actor intends to convey a message. 2 The conduct
must be "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall
signal our belief that a constitutional amendment is the best way to provide lasting protection
for the flag." 47 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., at 2741 (1989).
56. 135 CONG. REC. S14371 (daily ed. Oct., 31, 1989) (statement of Sen. Dole).
57. In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Professor Laurence Tribe
stated that the United States Supreme Court's narrow conclusion was that "[ilt is impermissi-
ble for a state prosecution to target those people who desecrate a flag in a manner that would
give offense to others." Statutory & Constitutional Responses to the Supreme Court Decision
in Texas v. Johnson: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1989) (hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Laurence Tribe, Tyler
Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard Law School). Tribe noted that "if the government
simply banned all flag destruction, the ruling in Texas v. Johnson would not apply, and the
flag destroyer could be punished because the prosection under such a law would not take aim
at the flag destroyer's message." Id.
58. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
59. See Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 542 (testimony of Walter Dellinger, Profes-
sor of Law, Duke University Law School).
60. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543 (1989). The majority stated: "If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."
Id. at 2544.
61. 391 U.S. 367 (1967).
62. Id. at 376. Chief Justice Warren stated: "We cannot accept the view that an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the
conduct intends thereby to express an idea." Id.
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within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."" In re-
viewing communicative conduct, the Court considers whether "[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and ...
[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be under-
stood by those who viewed it.""'
Since 1931, the Supreme Court has recognized the communica-
tive nature of conduct with respect to the flag. 5 In Stromberg v.
California," the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California
statute prohibiting the display of a red flag "as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government. '67 Similarly, the
Court concluded in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette" that saluting the flag is a form of political communication
that cannot be compulsory upon a person who objects to that form of
communication." Further, in Street v. New York,7 0 the Court invali-
dated a New York statute that made it a crime to cast contempt
upon the flag by words or acts."'
But all conduct aimed toward the flag is not inevitably expres-
sive.2 In Texas v. Johnson,"3 the defendant's flag burning was the
culmination of a political demonstration. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, stated that "[tihe expressive, overtly political na-
ture of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly appar-
ent. 7 4 Therefore, the Texas statute was subjected to the Court's
63. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
64. ld. at 410-11.
65. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (salut-
ing the flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931) (displaying a red flag).
66. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
67. Id. at 369.
68. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
69. Id. at 632-33. Barnette held that states may not compel persons to salute or pledge
the allegiance to the flag. Id. In addition, the Barnette decision determined that i legislature
cannot require a person to demonstrate his respect for the flag by saluting it. Id. Similarly, the
legislature cannot forbid one from demonstrating his disrespect for the flag. See Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). Justice Harlan wrote: "[T]he constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom
to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary' and the 'right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order,' encompass the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about
our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous." Id. at 593.
70. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
71. Id. at 578. The Court's narrow decision focused on the "words" clause of the statute
and failed to address the constitutionality of the "act" clause. Id. at 587. The majority stated:
"[Elven assuming that the record precludes the inference that [Street's] conviction might have
been based solely on his words, we are still bound to reverse if the conviction could have been
based upon both his words and his act". Id. (emphasis in original).
Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Warren noted, "The parties obviously believe that
the constitutionality of flag-desecration statutes is before the Court . . .But the Court specifi-
cally refuses to decide this issue." Id. at 595 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
72. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2540. Texas conceded that Johnson's conduct was expressive. Id.
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most stringent scrutiny.75 In defense of its statute, Texas asserted
two separate interests to justify Johnson's conviction: (1) preventing
breaches of the peace, and (2) maintaining the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity.76 The Court declined to address the
first issue, concluding that a breach of the peace was not implicated
on the record." As for the State's second interest, the Court found it
was related to the suppression of expression. 8
It is difficult to conceive of an alternative interest that the fed-
eral government could advance to avoid implicating first amendment
issues under a federal statute banning flag desecration. If attaching a
peace symbol to a flag, 9 saluting the flag,80 or displaying a flag 8l are
symbolic speech protected by the first and fourteenth amendments, it
logically follows that public flag burning is equally expressive con-
duct contemplated by the first and fourteenth amendments.
B. The Government's Objective in Prohibiting Flag Burning
In Texas v. Johnson,82 the Court stated that "[ilt is .. .not
simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the gov-
ernmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a re-
striction on that expression is valid.""3 In United States v. O'Brien,"
the United States Supreme Court established a four-prong test as
the first amendment standard for government regulations of expres-
sive conduct:88
[A] government regulation [of expressive conduct] is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest.88
The Flag Protection Act of 1989 satisfied the first prong of the
75. Id. at 2543 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,
622-23 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
76. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.
77. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2541 (1989).
78. Id.
79. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
80. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
81. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
82. 109 S. Ct. 2537 (1989).
83. Id. at 2541.
84. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
85. Id. at 377.
86. Id.
95 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1991
O'Brien analysis since Congress has legislated with respect to the
flag on several occasions in the past.87 Under the second prong, the
government asserted an interest in preserving the physical integrity
of the flag as a national symbol.88 The prohibition of desecration of
the American flag is clearly related to and facilitates this objective.
Nonetheless, to satisfy the O'Brien test, Congress's objective in
protecting the physical integrity of the flag must be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Even assuming that Congress's inter-
est in protecting the flag as a national symbol is valid, it is directly
related to free speech when enforced against one making a political
statement.89 The government's prohibition of flag desecration is
aimed at preserving the physical integrity of the flag as the nation's
symbol. 90 Mutilating or burning the flag as part of a political protest
is expressive conduct and Congress's objective in protecting the in-
tegrity of the American flag suppresses this form of political
expression."
Congress argued, however, that the Flag Protection Act of 1989
was content-neutral, applied without regard to the content of the
message conveyed, and therefore, was unrelated to the regulation of
expression."" In contrast to the 1968 federal law prohibiting con-
temptuous treatment of the flag,'" the Flag Protection Act of 1989
applied regardless of whether the defendant burned the flag to con-
vey disrespect or admiration for the American flag. The federal stat-
ute did not refer to "desecration," nor did it turn on whether the
prohibited conduct would offend others. 94 The statute applied with-
out regard to whether the defendant's conduct took place in public
or private and without regard to the message conveyed. The statute
gave protesters other alternatives through which to communicate
their message. The federal statute also eliminated concerns regard-
ing the disposal of a worn American flag by specifically excluding
from the law the burning of a worn flag in compliance with
87. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
88. See Kime v. United States, 103 U.S. 949, 953 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("The Government suggests only one possible 'substantial governmental
interest' underlying § 700-'preservation of the flag,' not as a mere chattel, but as the 'visible
embodiment of the Nation' ") (quoting from Brief for United States at 4, United States v.
Kime, 673 F.2d 1318 (4th Cir. 1982)).
89. Id.
90. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
91. Kime, 103 U.S. at 953-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
92. Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 184 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor
of Law and Dean, The University of Chicago Law School).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 700(a) (1968).
94. Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 183 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone).
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tradition.9"
The statute reached both public and private acts, however, and
this raised additional considerations. 6 "What of the books, newspa-
pers and magazines that contain depictions of the flag . . . . Is it
now to be criminal even in the privacy of the home, not to treat these
as venerated objects? ' ' 97 A statute may be considered content-neu-
tral, but the Supreme Court still may find that its restrictions on free
expression outweigh governmental interests. For example, in Schnei-
der v. State,9 8 the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the
public distribution of leaflets was unconstitutional because the re-
strictive impact of such a law on free expression outweighed the gov-
ernment's legitimate interest in reducing litter.99
A statute must further a legitimate governmental interest, and
must place only incidental restrictions on free speech. The Court in
O'Brien stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can jus-
tify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."' 100 In
Johnson, however, the Supreme Court held that the Government's
interest in preserving the national flag as the American symbol did
not justify punishing a person for politically burning the flag. 10'
The interests that motivated Congress to pass the Flag Protec-
tion Act of 1989 parallel the interests advanced by Texas in John-
son. The Supreme Court considered the state's concern that "[flag
burning] will lead people to believe either that the flag does not
stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other,
less positive concepts, or that . . . we do not enjoy unity as a Na-
tion." 0 The Court concluded: "These concerns blossom only when a
95. Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a) (Supp. 1990). The federal statute
provides in pertinent part: "This subsection does not prohibit any conduct consisting of the
disposal of a flag when it has become worn or soiled." Id. See also 36 U.S.C. § 176(k) (1976)
("The flag, when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display, should
be destroyed in a dignified way, preferably by burning.").
96. Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 183-84 (statement of Geoffrey R. Stone).
97. Id.
98. 308 U.S. 141 (1943).
99. Id. at 147.
100. Id. at 376. The defendant in O'Brien was prosecuted for burning his Selective Ser-
vice registration certificate. The Court determined that the Government had a substantial in-
terest in ensuring the continued availability of issued Selective Service certificates, id. at 381,
and upheld the Governmental regulation at issue. The Court concluded that the regulation was
narrowly tailored to ensure the efficient functioning of the Selective Service System and that
there were no alternative means by which the Government could achieve the same goal. Id. at
381.
101. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2547 (1989).
102. Id. at 2542.
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person's treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus
are related 'to the suppression of free expression' within the meaning
of O'Brien."'"s
The Johnson Court acknowledged the legitimacy of Texas's in-
terest in enacting regulations providing for the appropriate treatment
of the flag. 10 4 Yet, the Court noted that "[t]o say that the Govern-
ment has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag,
however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for
burning a flag as a means of political protest."'1 5 Johnson was prose-
cuted because his conduct was likely to cause serious offense. The
Supreme Court maintained that the Texas law turned on the com-
municative impact of the defendant's message and unconstitutionally
regulated free speech.' 08 In addition, the Court held that Texas's as-
serted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity
itself was related to the suppression of expression. 0 7
IV. The Supreme Court's Review of the Federal Statute
The Flag Protection Act of 1989 was drafted in an effort to
overcome the constitutional deficiencies found in the Texas law.'0 8
The federal statute attempted to prohibit the physical act of burning
the American flag without implicating free-speech issues. The fed-
eral law took effect on October 28, 1989, barely forty-eight hours
before four eager protesters ignited a flag on the Capitol steps to
challenge the new law.' 09 The Capitol police arrested the four
protesters," 0 and three of the four were charged in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia with violating the Flag
Protection Act of 1989."'
.103. Id.
104. Id. at 2543-44.
105. Id. at 2547.
106. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2543-44 (1989).
107. Id. at 2545-46.
108. See text accompanying notes 33-36.
109. CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., at 2952 (Nov. 1989).
110. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at A25, col. 1. Nancy Kent, a spokeswoman for the
four protesters, bellowed from the steps of the Capitol: "We defy your law and we challenge
you . . . . Arrest us. Test your statute. Take it back to the Supreme Court and try once again
to claim it is all consistent with your constitutional standards of free speech." L.A. Times, Oct.
31, 1989, at A4, col. 1. Ms. Kent is a member of aNew York-based group called the "Emer-
gency Committee to Stop the Flag Amendment and Laws." See Wash. Times, Oct. 31, 1989,
at A6, col. 1. Ms. Kent remarked that various members of her group are "extremely patriotic,
but they still hate the flag . . . . I personally hate America," Kent said. Id. Gregory Lee
Johnson was one of the four protesters arrested. L.A. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
111. See 135 CONG. REC. S16191 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Mitch-
ell). The United States Attorney's office determined that the evidence was insufficient to
charge Gregory Lee Johnson. See e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S14562 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989)
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In Seattle, Washington, another set of four protesters " ' burned
a United States flag belonging to the United States Postal Service
during a "Festival of Defiance.""' Attorneys William Kunstler and
David Cole of the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York
defended the Seattle and District of Columbia protesters, arguing
that although the federal statute differs from the Texas statute in
Texas v. Johnson,1 ' "[i]t still differentiates between conduct
favorable to the flag and conduct unfavorable to it."11 5 United States
District Judge June L. Green in the District of Columbia and United
States District Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein in Seattle respec-
tively held that the Flag Protection Act of 1989 was unconstitutional
and dismissed the charges against the protesters."" The United
States appealed both decisions directly to the United States Supreme
Court pursuant to a unique proviso in the federal statute. "' The two
(statement of Sen. Dole). Johnson labeled the failure to prosecute him a "gross miscarriage of
justice." See Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1989, at AS, col. 1. Senator Robert Dole initially was dis-
gusted with the United States Attorney's decision, but later concluded that "the U.S. attor-
ney's decision may not have been such a bad idea after all. The U.S. attorney has denied
Johnson his day in the Sun, his fifteen seconds of fame and Johnson sure is furious." 135
CONG. Rac. S14563 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1989).
The three defendants, Shawn D. Eichman, David Gerald Blalock and Scott W. Tyler,
were prosecuted. Scott Tyler stirred controversy in Chicago earlier in 1989 by placing an
American flag on the floor as part of an art exhibit at the Chicago School of Art Institute. See
D'Amato & Fein, Censorship: Is 'the Flag on the Floor' Valid Speech? A.B.A. J., 42 (May
1989). Tyler's work of art prompted the passage of several national and local bans on such
activity. See id.
Tyler's appearance before the Supreme Court marks the second time he has defended his
right to deface the flag. In Chicago v. Aubin, 89 C.H. 8763 (C.P. Cook County 1989), Tyler
was one of ten artists prosecuted under the Chicago ordinance that made it a crime to treat
offensively the flag. The Cook County Circuit Court judge invalidated the ordinance, relying
heavily on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
112. Mark John Haggerty, Carlos Garza, Jennifer Proctor Campbell and Darius Allen
Strong were charged in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton for violation of the Flag Protection Act of 1989. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct.
2404 (1990).
113. The four protesters distributed publicity leaflets which read: "Blind patriotism must
not be the law of the land. Unlike the flag-kissers, we will not whine, we will Rock and Roll in
a Festival of Defiance." NAT'L L.J., I, 27 (May 14, 1990).
114. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
115. 12 NAT'L L.J. 1, 27 (May 14, 1990). William Kunstler and David Cole also suc-
cessfully defended Gregory Lee Johnson in Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
116. United States v. Eichman, 731 F.Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990); United States v. Hag-
gerty, 731 F.Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
117. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 700(d) (Supp. 1990) provides in relevant part:
(d)(1) If the question of the constitutionality of this section, under the first
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States, is properly
presented in any case before a United States district court, that court shall, if
the Supreme Court of the United States has not previously ruled on that ques-
tion, immediately certify that question to the Supreme Court.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, if it has not previously ruled on that question,
accept jurisdiction over the certified question and advance on the docket and
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cases were consolidated on appeal in United States v. Eichman." 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Eichman was entirely predict-
able. Justice William Brennan delivered the very brief opinion of the
Court less than one month after hearing oral argument. In another
five-four decision, 1 9 the Supreme Court determined that, "although
Congress cast the Flag Protection Act in somewhat broader terms
than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, the Act still suffers from
the same fundamental flaw: it suppresses expression out of concern
for its likely communicative impact" and is, therefore, unconstitu-
tional.' 10 The federal government conceded that the protesters' flag
burning constituted expressive conduct, but asserted that the federal
statute does not target expressive conduct on the basis of the content
of its message.' 2 ' The Court acknowledged that the federal statute
contained "no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of pro-
hibited conduct," but noted that the Government's asserted interest
in protecting the physical integrity of the flag in order to safeguard
its identity "as the unique and unalloyed symbol of the Nation" was
"related to the suppression of free expression."' 22
The Supreme Court concluded that the specific wording of the
federal statute's prohibitions confirms the Government's interest in
the communicative nature of flag desecration. 23 Under the Flag Pro-
tection Act, anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically
defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon"
any flag is subject to criminal penalties. 4 The Court reasoned that
these terms "unmistakably connote[] disrespectful treatment of the
flag and suggest[] a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag's
symbolic value."'' 25 The Court also stated that: "[the Act's] restric-
expedite to the greatest extent possible the disposition of that question. The Su-
preme Court may, with respect to such question, give binding instructions or
require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in
controversy.
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall promptly notify the Clerk of the
House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate of the receipt of such
certification, and each House of Congress shall have the right to intervene in the
case for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of this section."
Id.
118. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
119. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Connor joined. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4744.
120. Id. at 4746.
121. Id. at 4745.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 700(a)(1) (Supp. 1990).
125. United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744, 4745 (1990).
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tion on expression cannot be 'justified without reference to the con-
tent of the regulated speech.' "126
Additionally, the Court was not persuaded by the Government's
reference to a "national consensus" favoring a prohibition on flag
burning, stating that, "[e]ven assuming such a consensus exists, any
suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech be-
comes more weighty as popular opposition to that speech grows is
foreign to the First Amendment. 12 7 Justice Brennan asserted that
"[p]unishing desecration of the flag dilutes the very freedom that
makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."
128
Justice Stevens, building upon his dissent in Johnson,29 again
disagreed with the majority's reasoning. Stevens wrote, "The impact
[of flag desecration] is purely symbolic, and it is apparent that some
thoughtful persons believe that impact, far from depreciating the
value of the symbol, will actually enhance its meaning. I most re-
spectfully disagree. '" ' Stevens maintained that "[tihe freedom of
expression protected by the First Amendment embraces not only the
freedom to communicate particular ideas, but also the right to com-
municate them effectively. That right, however, is not absolute
"131
V. Round II for the Constitutional Amendment
Within two days of the Eichman decision, the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights voted five to three
to send a constitutional amendment resolution' s to the House Judi-
ciary Committee, with a recommendation to defeat it. Although pro-
ponents of the constitutional amendment wrapped themselves in the
flag, opponents shifted the focus to the Bill of Rights of the Consti-
tution, arguing, "No one wants the flag burned, but neither does an-
yone want their [sic] First Amendment rights trampled."'3 3 The pro-
posed constitutional amendment ultimately was defeated in the
126. Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
127. Id. at 2746.
128. Id.
129. 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2564 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 287, 299 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. H.J. Res. 350, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H4088 (1990). The Senate
offered an identical constitutional amendment resolution. S.J. Res. 332, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S8693-04 (1990). The House and Senate resolutions modeled the prior
unsuccessful proposed constitutional amendment. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
133. 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., 1877, 1877 (1990) (statement of Rep. Mike Synar, D-
Okla.).
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House.1"4 The Senate's proposed constitutional amendment also was
defeated. The Senate vote was legislatively irrelevant in light of the
House's defeat of the measure five days prior to the Senate vote."
The defeat of the proposed constitutional amendment in the
House and Senate put to rest the issue of flag desecration for the
101st Congress. Yet, many lawmakers predict that the issue will re-
surface in the 102nd Congress. Minority Whip Newt Gingrich antic-
ipates that there will be a renewed push in 1991 for a constitutional
amendment to prohibit flag desecration. 3 6 First Amendment scholar
Professor Bernard James said that flag burning "will be pertinent as
long as the flag is being burned, and it isn't burned that often.' 3 7
VI. Federal Alternatives
A. Federal Breach of the Peace Statute
In Texas v. Johnson,' the United States Supreme Court noted
that its analysis would have differed if the defendant's prosecution
was not related to expressive conduct.' Therefore, Congress must
draft a law that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.' " For
example, Congress could draft a narrowly-defined statute aimed at
prohibiting all flag desecration likely to incite immediate violence.14 '
In Street v. New York, " 2, however, the Supreme Court disregarded
the state's contention that it had a legitimate interest in punishing
the defendant for vocally inciting others to commit unlawful acts.
4 3
The Court concluded that the defendant's words, coupled with his
flag burning, did not provoke unlawful conduct.'4 4 Moreover, the
state's statute was not specifically drawn "to punish only those defi-
ant or contemptuous words which amount to incitement.' 4 5
It is well-established that speech or expressive conduct likely to
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1962. The vote fell thirty-four votes short of the two-thirds necessary for
passage.
136. Id. at 2063.
137. Telephone interview with Bernard James, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University
School of Law (Aug. 24, 1990).
138. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
139. Id. at 2538 n.3.
140. See. e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1973); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
141. Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 113 (testimony of Laurence Tribe, Tyler Pro-
fessor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
142. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).




provoke an immediate breach of the peace is not protected by the
first amendment.14 Also, the Government may not prohibit the ex-
pression of disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that
their disagreeableness will incite violence.1 7 Every provocative idea
will not incite violence and the Court will carefully consider whether
the expression is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."' 8
The United States Supreme Court held that Gregory Lee John-
son's flag burning was not likely "to provoke the average person to
retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace.' '""4 In addition,
Johnson's action produced no breach of the peace. The fact that
Texas had a statute specifically providing for breaches of the
peace 60 indicated to the Court that punishing flag burning was un-
necessary to maintain peace.' 6' Although Congress may draft a stat-
ute prohibiting mistreatment of the American flag in situations likely
to cause a breach of the peace, the Supreme Court may conclude
that flag desecration is not among the "fighting words" likely to in-
cite the average person to retaliate and breach the peace.
B. The Flag Protection Act of 1990
Shortly after the United States House of Representatives voted
down the proposed constitutional amendment, it considered the Flag
Protection Act of 1990.151 This proposed statute would have prohib-
ited damage to the flag under certain circumstances, including action
inciting violence or damage to a federally owned flag.' 53 Representa-
tive Jim Cooper, who sponsored the legislation, argued that the legis-
lation is not intended "to punish speech, but to punish vandalism
against our flag.'' 4 Many lawmakers felt that the Flag Protection
Act of 1990 represented a political coverup for those who did not
support the constitutional amendment, but who did not want to be
146. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Justice Murphy wrote:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitu-
tional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72.
147. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2541 (1989).
148. Id. at 2542 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
149. Id. at 2542, (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
150. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1989).
151. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541.
152. H.R. 5091, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H4088 (1990).
153. Id.
154. 136 CONG. REc. H4088 (June 21, 1990).
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viewed as voting against the American flag. 156 The legislation was
defeated in the House, and a similar bill was defeated in the Sen-
ate.186 It is possible, however, that a law similar to the Flag Protec-
tion Act of 1990 would survive constitutional scrutiny. In United
States v. Eichman, 1 7 Justice Brennan wrote: "Today's decision does
not affect the extent to which the Government's interest in protecting
publicly owned flags might justify special measures on their
behalf."'
C. Federal Statute Protecting the Flag's Function as an Incident
of Sovereignty
The Flag Protection Act of 1989 represented Congress's at-
tempt to draft a content-neutral, blanket ban on the mistreatment of
the flag.18 9 The Texas statute in the Johnson decision, on the other
hand, prohibited only destructive conduct with respect to the flag
that would seriously offend others. The federal statute would have
made it a crime to destroy the flag regardless of the reaction it
evoked or the actor's motive. Professor Laurence Tribe, testifying
before the House Judiciary Committee, asserted that there is noth-
ing "questionable, either as a matter of tradition or as a matter of
constitutional law, about a governmental decision to protect special
places or objects by making their physical mutilation or destruction
a crime."'160 Tribe referred to the government's power to legislate
with respect to desecrating gravesites' 6' or protecting the American
eagle 162 as examples of Congress's ability to designate certain items
or places as remaining free from physical destruction.'"
In United States v. Eichman,'" the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that the Government has a legitimate interest
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 110 S..Ct. 2404 (1990).
158. Id. at 4745 n.5.
159. See Note, Congressional Prohibition of Contemptuous Flag Burning Suppresses
Constitutionally Protected Free Speech, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1553-54 (1983). The
author concludes that "[i]f Congress wants to protect the symbolic integrity of the flag, then
Congress should enact a flag protection statute that either prohibits all flag burnings ... or
that prohibits only flag burnings that are likely to produce immediate violence." Id.
160. House Hearings, supra note 57, at 114-15 (testimony of Laurence Tribe, Tyler
Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
161. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 114, 117(c) (1974) (molestation of graves in national
park).
162. 16 U.S.C.A. § 668 (1940).
163. House Hearings, supra note 57, at 103 (testimony of Laurence Tribe, Tyler Profes-
sor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School).
164. 58 U.S.L.W. 4744 (1990).
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in preserving the flag's function as an "incident of sovereignty."' 165
The Court noted that, "Aside from the flag's association with partic-
ular ideals, at some irreducible level the flag is emblematic of the
Nation as a sovereign entity.""' The Court concluded that the Flag
Protection Act of 1989, which penalized anyone who knowingly mu-
tilated, burned or defiled any American flag, was not designed to
advance the asserted interest "in maintaining the association be-
tween the flag and the Nation. ' 167 Yet, the Court left open the ex-
tent to which this interest could be protected. The Court noted,
"[W]e need not address today the extent to which this interest may
justify any laws regulating conduct that would thwart this core func-
tion, as might a commercial or like appropriation of the image of the
United States flag.""' It is clear that such a federal statute would
have to satisfy the fourth prong of the Court's test for content-neu-
tral restrictions set forth in United States v. O'Brien.69 "[T]he inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be
"no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." '170
VI. State Statutory Responses
The Johnson decision invalidated most state flag protection stat-
utes. Consequently, state lawmakers revised and amended their state
statutes in 1990 in an effort to fall within the perceived constitu-
tional boundaries of the Johnson decision. The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Eichman now casts doubt on the validity of some of these
revised state laws. South Dakota modeled its statute after the Flag
Protection Act of 1989.171 The Eichman decision is unambiguous
with respect to the constitutionality of South Dakota's statute.17 1
On the other hand, the constitutionality of Maryland's statute173
is uncertain. Maryland's breach of the peace statute provides that a
person may not intentionally desecrate the flags of the United States
or the State of Maryland in a manner intended to incite or produce
an imminent breach of the peace or under circumstances likely to
incite or produce an imminent breach of the peace.1 74 The Maryland




169. 391 U.S. 367 (1986). See also supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
170. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367.
171. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-9-1 (1990).
172. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
173. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 83 (1990).
174. Id.
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statute also includes a severability clause, which provides that if a
provision in the statute is found to be invalid, the remainder of the
statute may be given effect separate from the invalid provision. 170 It
is conceivable that Maryland's statute would pass constitutional
scrutiny.
The statute drafted by Kentucky 17 6 appears to advance the gov-
ernmental interest in preserving the flag's function as an "incident of
sovereignty"'177 acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Eichman.
The Kentucky statute prohibits the "[p]rinting or lettering of any
kind on the flag of the United States, or the use of the flag for adver-
tising purposes in any manner.' 7 8 The Kentucky law appears to be
content-neutral and furthers the governmental interest "in maintain-
ing the association between the flag and the Nation.'
7 9
Other states have avoided implicating constitutional issues and
have enacted statutes that preserve and enhance the symbolic value
of the American flag. As Justice Stevens noted in Eichman,
[tihe symbolic value of the American flag is not the same today
as it was yesterday. Events during the last three decades have
altered the country's image in the eyes of numerous Americans,
and some now have difficulty understanding the message that
the flag conveyed to their parents and grandparents."' i80
In Virginia, the legislature enacted a statute that exempts from
Virginia's retail sales and use tax "[s]ales by a government agency
of the official flags of the United States, the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, or of any county, city or town."'' The state of Vermont en-
acted a similar statute that exempts sales of the American flag to
and by veterans' organizations from the Vermont sales and use
tax.'
8 2
In West Virginia, the legislature passed an act providing that
the casket of a deceased national guard member who has completed
an obligatory period of service in the national guard, has not been
dishonorably discharged, and who is not otherwise eligible to receive
an American flag, may be draped in a flag of the United States.'
175. Id.
176. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.050 (Baldwin 1990).
177. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanyifig text.
178. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.050 (Baldwin 1990).
179. United States v. Eichman, 58 U.S.L.W. 4744, 4745 n.6 (1990).
180. Id. at 4747 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-608 (Supp. 1990).
182. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9741(32) (Supp. 1990).
183. W. VA. CODE § 15-18-23 (Supp. 1990). After the burial of the deceased national
guard member, the flag will be given to the parent or spouse of the deceased person. Id.
FLAG PROTECTION LEGISLATION
The Virginia, Vermont, and West Virginia statutes give effect to the
words of Justice Brennan in Texas v. Johnson:184 "We can imagine
no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one's
own, no better way to counter a flag-burner's message than by salut-
ing the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even
of the flag that burned than by . . .according its remains a proper
burial." 185
VII. Conclusion
Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurring opinion in Johnson that
"[t]he hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not
like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result."'l 6
Justice Kennedy is correct. Flag desecration laws prohibit one of the
most expressive, albeit dislikeable, forms of political speech. As un-
popular as it may be, flag desecration in its crudest forms is expres-
sive, and the Court has been evenhanded in striking laws that burden
the freedom of expression.
The United States Congress was also correct in defeating the
proposed constitutional amendment to prohibit the destruction of the
American flag. To submit to such a solemn process in an effort to
destroy an unpopular form of expression would denigrate the princi-
ples for which the United States Constitution stands. If the Constitu-
tion is amended to protect the physical integrity of the American
flag, the doors would be opened for amending the Constitution when-
ever an emotional, inflammatory dispute arises between the majority
of our citizens and the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the best way to protect our flag is to defend the free-
dom of those so misguided as to deface our national symbol. By pro-
tecting this activity, flag burners will have no incentive to defy an-
other law or challenge the Government. Ironically, in defending flag
desecration, Americans are protecting the freedom that it represents.
S. Kathryn Spruill
184. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
185. Id. at 2555.
186. Id. at 2555.

